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TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCEMuch discussion of corporate governance is what one might call Platonic-
revelatory, or what Popper called essentialist. That there is such a univer-
sal as ‘good corporate governance’ is taken for granted. The job of the
scholar or guru is to define what it is and reveal its implications, much as
Plato pursued the essence of truth and beauty. In fact, of course, there is
no model of an essential or proper form of capitalism which the law should
embody. Company law in any country is the product of clashing domestic
interests and ideologies, within the framework of that country’s modal polit-
ical values and cultural predispositions.
The current debate about corporate governance in Japan revolves around
two axes. First, the nationalist axis sets the desirability of introducing
changes seen as conforming to global (i.e., American) standards against the
desirability of preserving valuable elements of Japanese tradition.
Second,the class axis, which is about framing the law to give pre-eminent
consideration to the interests of owners vis-à-visthe retention of substantial
rights for employees. In the former dimension, Enron and World Com have
led to some reversal of Americanising trends, but the shift in institutions
and establishment ideology on the second dimension has been, and contin-
ues to be, one way – emphasising the power and interests of shareholders.
It is no exaggeration to say that a quiet shareholder revolution has taken
place in Japan. 
The first half of 2006 saw practically every magazine in Japan and count-
less television programmes featuring articles and documentaries on kakusa-
mondai (widening income inequality). Extraordinarily, the debate seems to
involve no reference to this shareholder revolution in spite of the probabili-
ty that, as over the last quarter-century in the United States, its long-term
consequence will be a growing gulf between rich and poor.
Iwanami Shoten’s (2006) Dare no tame no kaisha ni suru ka (Whose bene-
fit should the law make corporations serveseeks to sound the alarm.
‘Managers need to give consideration to all stakeholders and not just share-
holders’ has recently become common rhetoric among leading industrialists.
It needs to be given institutional reinforcement in company law if it is to be
more than hypocritical rhetoric. I make some concrete suggestions in that
regard towards the end of this paper. 
The nature of corporate governance best revealed in crisis.
The crucial aspects of a country’s corporate governance system — in
Leninn’s term, the ‘who whom’ of corporate governance — best shows up
in times of crisis: e.g., when someone tries to get rid of the CEO or when
there is a hostile takeover bid. It is instructive to compare three examples
of oustiing a CEO: [a] ‘Chainsaw’ Dunlop from Sunbeam, [b] Okada Shigeru
from Mitsukoshi, and [c] Okuma Takao from Okuma Machine Tools. The
2first was a case of summary dismissal by external directors, who heavily
invested personally in Sunbeam, in response to an alarming fall in the share
price.  The second was a result of a shift in the CEO’s internal and exter-
nal reputation which was catalysed by the moral suasion of one outside
director, a representative of the store’s main bank, leading to the board vot-
ing for dismissal. The third, which was catalysed by the employee union’s
strike threat, was also a result of a growing conviction within the firm that
the CEO cared more for his family than for the firm. The first exemplifies
what I propose to call the ‘shareholder property model’ of the firm: the view
that the firm is an instrument for its owners’ profit. The other two exem-
plify what I propose to call the ‘quasi-community model’ of the firm: the
view that the firm is a community of people who are committed to work in
it, run by its elders who are primarily concerned with the reputation and
future prosperity of the firm and the welfare of its members.
The difference ought to show up much more clearly than it does in the cur-
rent Japanese debate about hostile takeovers. Neo-classical economists
take the shareholder property model for granted, and claim that takeovers
are essential elements of market discipline, which harnesses greed and fear
to improve the efficiency of managers in the use of scarce resources and
consequently enhances general welfare. Take apart the underlying assump-
tions of this argument – e.g., that a company’s share price represents the
present value of the discounted stream of future earnings as estimated by
the best-informed analysts – as well as studies of the efficiency effect and
the welfare effect of takeovers in other societies, and the hollowness of the
argument is obvious. But, even though institutional economists have con-
stantly made such arguments elsewhere,their rebuttals seem to be rarely
heard in consensus-loving Japan.
Global standards and the social infrastructure of corporate governance
The currency of definitions of corporate governance, which effectively
restrict it to relations between owners and managers, is a function of the
global cultural dominance of the Anglophone world, a dominance such that
Czechs, Japanese and even French seek to put their corporate governance
theorising in English. German institutions in which employees have strong
legal rights and Japanese institutions in which they had strong convention-
al rights are treated, in footnotes, as aberrations.  
A more encompassing definition would concentrate on power and its dis-
tribution – who can coerce, or who is in a better position to persuade,
whom to do what, and to determine who gets what in the distribution of
the value which the firm adds to its inputs.
3Corporate governance is not like the metric system. There is no compelling
reason for global uniformity – compelling, that is, to anyone other than
members of the global finance industry. National variation has two sources.
One is political values – i.e., the national bias to social democratic or neo-
liberal ideologies. Compare, for instance, the German with the American
system. The other is the level of generalised trust. Some degree of ‘institu-
tionalisation of suspicion’ in forms of accountability is necessary anywhere.
But the extent to which one can chiefly rely on managers’ consciences for
honest and competent management, or alternatively, the extent to which
one needs to carry the ‘everybody is a potential crook’ assumptions to
Sarbanes-Oxley proportions varies from country to country. Japan is still,
though diminishingly so, blessed with a business culture with reasonably
robust consciences and levels of personal trust.
Why reform in Japan?
There has been a veritable flurry of reforms of corporate governance, cul-
minating in the major company law revision of 2002 and its consolidation
in the ‘colloquial’ revamp of 2005. All were reforms which brought
Japanese legal institutions closer to those of the United States. What has
inspired them? The reasons usually offered cry out for a sceptical look: cor-
porate scandals, indecisive management, loss of innovative capacity, over-
investment, low returns to capital, and neglect of shareholders. I believe
that the true reasons were: [a] the loss of the national self-confidence
induced by thirty years of high growth performance and with it the loss of
pride in ‘truly Japanese’ institutions; [b]the arrival to positions of influence
in the governmental, academic and corporate bureaucracies of the ‘brain-
washed generation’ of American-trained MBAs and PhDs; and [c] the
growth of foreign ownership of Japanese equities from 5% in 1990 to close
to 25% today.
What reforms?
The legal changes on the whole, in spite of their declared intentions to rec-
tify the disempowerment of shareholders, greatly increased managerial
autonomy more than they enhanced shareholder power. It is significant that
only a small minority of firms have availed themselves of the option of an
external-director-dominated committee system of governance offered in the
2002 law revision, and many of those for reasons which have nothing to
do with the motives of the drafters of the legislation. There have also been
other changes in board structure much more widely diffused and not
required by any legislation such as the slimming down of the main board
and the creation of a posse of ‘executive officers’and the appointment of
two or three external directors or the creation of an advisory board. In the
light of the arguments for these changes, one is entitled to ask whether
4they have made decision-making more efficient, speedier, and less likely to
lead to illegal or anti-social enterprise behaviour. My conclusion is that the
answers are, respectively, marginally, not at all, and marginally.
Shareholder power
The exercise of voice and the threat of exit are best considered separately.
Most subsidiaries, of course, have a dominant share-holding parent and the
new rules of consolidated reporting make sense. The banks and insurance
companies, which once held significant but still modest holdings of inde-
pendent companies, were always restrained in their monitoring except
when a firm was in real trouble. That is still the case, though banks have
had greatly to reduce the size of their holdings. They seem, however, to
have done so because they had to, not as a profit-making strategy a la
Deutsche Bank. The new dominant shareholder is the private equity/buy-out
fund. Steel Partners is the most famous of a dozen American funds which
acquires a 10-15% holding and then uses the threat of take-over to shake
down some under-priced cash-rich smallish firms. The Murakami fund, the
most prominent of the indigenous operators of this species, came a spec-
tacular crash when prosecutors, widely believed to be motivated by a gen-
eral aversion to ‘money-game’ operations chose its owner for a rare indict-
ment of insider trading. 
As for minority shareholders, their voice in AGM voting and in bringing or
threatening derivative suits is gradually being organisationally consolidated
by three organisations of institutional investors (ISS for foreigners,
Japanese pension funds, and the equity investors association of trust
banks) and also by one Nader-like association of public-spirited citizens.
These have succeeded in making some waves (on disclosure of directors’
salaries for example) and AGMs have become slightly more lively affairs;
they lasted on average for 48 minutes in 2005, compared with 29 minutes
in 1993.
But shareholder power has been chiefly enhanced by the fact that share-
holder exit and a fall in the share price is no longer the matter of indiffer-
ence to managers that it once was. The threat of takeover has become real.
Keeping up the share price has shut from ninth or tenth in the traditional
survey list of managerial objectives to the top. This is the real source of the
shareholder revolution.
Active discussion of anti-takeover defences started in 2004 in the Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), originally with a clear ‘fear of for-
eign takeover’ inspiration a la francaise. All nationalism was bled out of the
proceedings. However, Koizumi has promised the Americans a doubling of
foreign investment in Japan and the final report and subsequent guidelines
5were entirely in terms of agency theory and shareholder supremacy: that is
to say, essentially, poison pills were legitimate provided they were means
of getting the shareholders a better price from the predator, but never if
they were simply a function of the self-interest of incumbent management.
The possibility that the interest of incumbent management might be in the
welfare of the people they have worked with all their lives and not just in
its self has been explicitly ruled as irrelevant in court cases.
Give a dog the name self-interest and it becomes self-interested. One result
of this ‘quiet shareholder revolution’ is that top management increasingly
feels entitled to self-enrichment if they serve their shareholders well. Over
the period 2001-2004, in Japan’s biggest non-financial corporations
employing some 7 million workers, average worker remuneration fell by 5%
while directors’ salaries and bonuses rose by 59% as their reward for rais-
ing dividends by 70%. This is avastly different story from the last recovery
from recession for the period 1986-1989 when the figures were plus 14%,
21%, and 6%, respectively.
Old age under Shareholder Sovereignty
What price the argument that ‘we’re all shareholders now’ is that the main
beneficiaries of expanding shareholder returns are the great pension-fund-
participantmasses. Quite apart from the exceedingly skewed distribution of
capital income, it is an illusion to believe that funded pension schemes
somehow lessen the burden on the working generation when the pension-
er/worker ratio gets to the threatened 1:1.5 or 1:2. If pension funds are
largely invested domestically, there are two ways current production can be
translated into pensioner incomes:(1) via pay-as-you-go state pensions
which tax workers to pay pensioners, or (2) through returns to market
investment.  The former alternative [a] is less likely to lead to poverty or the
relief of poverty through grudging charity, [b] leaves current workers with
exactly the same real disposable income because the capital share would
have to become much larger if pension funds are to deliver, and [c] given
the likely supply and demand for capital, implies a division of national
income that is highly improbable.
Stakeholder power
To go back to Japan’s ‘quasi-community model’ that relates closely to what
is generally known in the corporate governance literature as stakeholder
theory, which is, in fact, not a theory, but a prescription. The quasi-com-
munity model — in which managers saw themselves as elders of an
employee community (who are themselves employees of ‘the firm’) rather
than as fiduciary agents of the owners, and in which managers consult with
an enterprise union, with major bank creditors and even with collective
6kyoryokukai organisations of sub-contractors regularly on major executive
decisions, — approximated closely to most notions of the ‘stakeholder
firm’. It did, however, give too great a weight to the enterprise union and
its leadership. (Union complicity in cover-ups, e.g., Minamata, being a fact
one could cite for that view.)
But still, why did those unions, the major beneficiaries of the quasi-com-
munity model, not defend it against the shareholder revolution? The near-
zero response of the major union federation Rengo to all the corporate gov-
ernance reforms is surprising. It can be explained in terms of (1) the usual
factors accounting for the decline in union militancy and union power in
advanced industrial society, plus (2) cumulative effects of educational
selection on the quality of union leadership, (3) the institutional incorpora-
tion of enterprise union leadership into managerial career development
tracks, and (4) the ideological dominance of the ‘reform = acceptance of
global standards in the interests of national competitiveness’ rhetoric so
firmly established already by previous governments even before Koizumi
made it his trademark.
Is a rethink beginning?
Enron and World Com took some wind from the sails of the neo-liberal
reformers marching under the ‘Global Standards’ banner. Four years later,
2005 brought the Livedoor shenanigans – a takeover bid for a radio station
by an internet portal operator which ended up in what looked like a tradi-
tional greenmail operation. It attracted enormous publicity because of
Livedoor’s CEO, a brash young arbitrageur, author of booster books for day
traders and proud owner of the ambition to head the company with the
world’s largest market cap. His subsequent arrest for fraud and the total
collapse of his company’s share bubble attracted equal publicity. Ditto for
the other up-and-coming arbitrageur, Murakami, already mentioned as
ruined by charges of insider trading. The country was never riper for a wave
of scepticism about the shareholder-sovereignty changes of the last
decade.
But all the older generation of ‘nostalgics’ for ‘the Japanese management
system’ could come up with was the CSR mantra, the corporate social
responsibility movement which took off in Japan post-Enron. This is a very
American import, whether based on the genuine moral feelings of tycoons
as they wake up in the middle of the night on their yachts or their ranches
and wonder what they are doing to the world, or equally Anglo-Saxon the-
ories of ‘reputation resource management’ as a profit-maximising strategy.
Its theoretical basis is ‘enlightened shareholder value theory’ which holds,
and sometimes tries with empirical data to prove it, that you can only max-
imise shareholder value (in the medium to long-term in which few share-
7holders are interested) if you care for (or appear to care for) your customers,
your employees, your distributors, your suppliers, etc. Socially Responsible
Investment funds which invest only in firms with good reputations exist in
Japan, but with minute shares of the market. But the crucial thing is that
the proponents of CSR never question the basic principle of shareholder
sovereignty. They have only one answer to ‘Whose company is it?’ ‘The
owners’, of course’.
The possible shape of a stakeholder company system
The law must give a different answer to that question if there is to be a
revival of the genuine concern for other stakeholders which was an essen-
tial part of Japanese management before 1990 — when managers couuld
concentrate on managing because they were secure in their jobs, protect-
ed from takeovers by cross-shareholdings, etc. Suteekuhorudaa has
become a common Japanese word. Successive Keidanren Chairmen,
Okuda from Toyota and Mitarai from Canon, are renowned for their enlight-
ened speeches about the need for managers to consider the interests of all
stakeholders, not just shareholders. But do they advocate institutional
measures to give managers an incentive to do just that and wean them off
their currently growing obsession with dividends and share-buy-backs as a
means of keeping up their share price?  No.
And yet, Japan still has the corporate social infrastructure for genuine
stakeholder firms in two respects.  First, top managers are nearly all home-
grown (as they were in the America of Galbraith’s Modern Industrial State),
product of a lifetime commitment to their firm and an executive labour mar-
ket hardly exists. Second, the bureaucratic internal promotion system has
been only slightly modified by recent ‘merit/performance not seniority’ doc-
trines and still is a powerful means of ensuring ‘commitment’.
I can think of three possible institutional changes which could build on these
advantages. The first is a curb on takeovers to mitigate the obsession with
keeping up the share price. A Takeover Assessment Committee (TAC)
could be useful. Tender bids would have to be approved by the committee
before they could be launched. The interests of the consumer are already
taken care of in the Anti-monopoly screening provisions. The composition
of the TAC would have to ensure that the effect of a possible takeover on
employees, suppliers, creditors and local communities, as well as returns to
shareholders were all put into the balance. It would have to work out its
own guidelines, which would have to involve judgements about both the
efficiency and the motives of both incumbent and would-be new manage-
ment.
8The second is to make a legal requirement of something like the manage-
ment-union consultation committees within firms (which are conventional-
ly established without any legal basis, continue to exist, but play a gradu-
ally diminishing role). But they should lose their binary ‘top
management/subordinate unionised employees’ nature. Call them Enterprise
Parliaments. Let them include representatives not only of the union, but also
of the middle managers who have graduated beyond union membership,
and are a crucial resource for expert and committed assessment of the per-
formance of older managers. It is also possible to include suppliers and
major creditors.
The third is a legal requirement to produce Value Added Accounts, show-
ing the sum total of value creation by the people working directly in the firm
with the capital resources that are made available to them. The accounts
should also make clear the division of value added as between employee
remuneration, taxes, interest, dividends and earnings retained within the
firm. The point is to make clear the ‘who gets what’ of the firm’s opera-
tions, and more particularly who gets what share of year-to-year increments
in value added.
There is no denying that the younger generation is more ‘individualistic’.
They are more likely to want to work in order to live rather than live in order
to work, more likely to find the conformist atmosphere of the traditional
quasi-community firm so stifling that they prefer constant job-hopping to
lifetime commitment. But even they might be happy to work in a genuine-
ly stakeholder firm. And as for the older generation of business leaders who
make such eloquent speeches about the Stakeholder Firm, there is only one
thing to be said: Walk the talk.
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